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Earnings inequality has increased substantially since the 1970s. Using evidence from confidential
Census data on U.S. law offices on lawyers' organization and earnings, we study the extent to which
the mechanism suggested by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), a scale of operations effect linking spans
of control and earnings inequality, is responsible increases in inequality.  We first show that earnings
inequality among lawyers increased substantially between 1977 and 1992, and that the distribution
of partner-associate ratios across offices changed in ways consistent with the hypothesis that coordination
costs fell during this period. We then propose a "hierarchical production function" in which output
is the product of skill and time and estimate its parameters, applying insights from the equilibrium
assignment literature. We find that coordination costs fell broadly and steadily during this period, so
that hiring one's first associate leveraged a partner's skill by about 30% more in 1992 than 1977.  We
find also that changes in lawyers' hierarchical organization account for about 2/3 of the increase in
earnings inequality among lawyers in the upper tail, but a much smaller share of the increase in inequality
between lawyers in the upper tail and other lawyers. These findings indicate that new organizational
efficiencies potentially explain increases in inequality, especially among individuals toward the top
of the earnings distribution.
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The returns to skill have risen substantially in the United States since the 1970s, as
has earnings inequality.1 These increases have taken place at the same time as large
changes in many ￿rms￿organizational structure which have resulted in increases in
managers￿￿spans of control￿(see e.g. Rajan and Wulf, 2006). This raises the issue of
whether changes in inequality have organizational underpinnings as well. If, as Lucas
(1978) and Rosen (1982) argue, highly-skilled managers are assigned greater spans of
control than less-skilled managers in equilibrium, and if managers￿spans are limited
by coordination costs, then decreases in coordination costs can increase earnings
inequality through their impact on spans of control. Recent research indicates that
changes in spans are important for understanding increases in earnings inequality
among at least one set of individuals; Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008)
provide evidence that changes in ￿rm size account for much of the post-1980 increase
in earnings inequality among CEOs at very large U.S. ￿rms.2
This paper examines these issues in the context of U.S. lawyers. How much has
earnings inequality increased, how much have the coordination costs associated with
hierarchical production declined, and how much of the increase in earnings inequality
re￿ ects lawyers￿organizational response to changes in these costs? We propose
an analytic framework based on Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006), and use this framework to answer these questions using law-o¢ ce level data
from the 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 Census of Service Industries.3
We ￿rst describe some general patterns regarding how lawyers￿earnings and hi-
erarchical organization changed during our sample period. We show that earnings
inequality across lawyers increased substantially and steadily between 1977 and 1992.
1See e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992). Card and DiNardo (2002) argue the growth does not start
until 1979, while other authors date the start as early as the mid 1970s. In other countries, the
growth in inequality took place but was smaller (except in the UK) and started later. See Autor
and Katz (1998) for a survey and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2007) for recent evidence.
2See also Kaplan and Rauh (2007) who ￿nd support in a wide range of settings for the idea that
scale e⁄ects can account for a large portion of the change in earnings inequality at the very top.
3The evidence in this paper builds upon our previous work (Garicano and Hubbard (2007a)),
which tests models of hierarchical production, proposes an econometric framework to estimate them,
and estimates the returns to hierarchy at one point in time. Our sample ends in 1992 because this
is the most recent year in which the Census asked law o¢ ces which ￿elds lawyers cover; we have
found that absent this information, we are unable to reliably estimate lawyers￿earnings from the
data the Census collects.
1We then document several preliminary facts that suggest that coordination costs re-
lated to working with associates also decreased over this period. First, the share of
lawyers who work in o¢ ces without any associates decreased between 1977 and 1992
by one-third from about 30% to about 20%. Second, the distribution of associate-
partner ratios across o¢ ces changed during this period so that the most ￿leveraged￿
lawyers in 1992 were almost 50% more leveraged than the most ￿leveraged￿lawyers
in 1977. Third, qualitatively, new information and communication technologies pen-
etrated deeply and broadly in the industry, which contemporary accounts indicate
had an important impact on how lawyers worked with each other. Together, these
facts suggest that working in hierarchical teams became cheaper in the law during
this period.
We then analyze these changes in more depth. We propose a production function
in which there are two inputs, skill and time, and a law o¢ ce￿ s output is the product
of the value of partners￿skill and the time that lawyers in the o¢ ce spend directly in
production.4 We show that the coordination cost of hierarchical production is identi-
￿ed by the ratio between revenues per lawyer ￿the o¢ ce￿ s average product ￿and the
marginal cost of an associate. In other words, the coordination cost of hierarchical
production is the extent to which there are decreasing returns to the scale of a hierar-
chical team.5 Of course, returns to scale in this context are returns to heterogeneous
units of inputs which are not perfect substitutes and match endogenously. Applying
ideas from assignment models and the hedonics literature, we estimate this marginal
cost for each o¢ ce, then use this estimate in speci￿cations that uncover the coordi-
nation costs of hierarchical production. We analyze how these costs have changed
over time, and develop counterfactual exercises that allow us to assess the extent
to which increases in earnings inequality re￿ ect lawyers￿organizational responses to
these changes. Our estimates indicate that coordination costs declined steadily be-
tween 1977 and 1992, such that hiring one￿ s ￿rst associate leveraged a partner￿ s skill
by about 30% more in 1992 than 1977. We provide some evidence that this is related
4Unlike in Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008), the organi-
zation of production involves endogenous matching between managers and workers; better managers
not only manage more e¢ ciency units or larger size teams, but also match with highest skilled
workers.
5An alternative interpretation of this ratio is that it re￿ ects that partners￿market power. In
this highly fragmented industry this is unlikely; we nevertheless consider and test this alternative
explanation and ￿nd that it is unlikely to account for the changes in this ratio that we uncover.
2to the di⁄usion of Lexis, a computer-aided legal research service; however, our data
do not allow us to provide de￿nitive evidence on precisely how information technology
has a⁄ected organizational structures and inequality in this industry.6 We ￿nd also
that most of the increase in inequality among top lawyers between 1977 and 1992
re￿ ects increases in associate-partner ratios that were responses to these decreases.
In contrast, we ￿nd that most of the increase in inequality between top lawyers and
other lawyers during this time re￿ ects other factors that increased the market value
of top lawyers￿skill relative to that of other lawyers￿skill, including skill-biased de-
mand shifts. Changes in lawyers￿hierarchical organization account for much of the
increase in inequality within the upper tail, but little of the increase in inequality
between lawyers in the upper tail and other lawyers.
Our work complements the literature on inequality by introducing coordination
costs as an important factor in explaining earnings inequality. Methodologically, we
do this by endogenizing organizational decisions: agents￿span of control re￿ ect op-
timizing behavior that trades o⁄ knowledge utilization and coordination costs. The
equilibrium that we obtain depicts not only the match between individuals, but also
involves di⁄erences in individuals￿hierarchical organization that correspond to skill
di⁄erences. We show how agents￿￿rst order conditions and equilibrium relationships
between individuals￿earnings and hierarchical organization can be exploited to esti-
mate parameters that re￿ ect coordination costs. A payo⁄ to this is that we can not
only assess the degree to which increases in earnings inequality relate to increases in
spans of control, but also investigate what drives these organizational changes. Our
estimates indicate not only that increases in earnings inequality among top lawyers
are related to changes in lawyers￿organization, but also that new organizational ef-
￿ciencies (perhaps enabled by new information technologies) are at the root of these
increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents some key facts
and discusses their context. Section 3 develops our analytic framework. We propose
an equilibrium model of knowledge-based hierarchies and describe how we use this
6Our data allows us to exploit the idea that decreases in coordination costs increase the returns
to hierarchical production, which is related to Garicano￿ s (2000) ￿nding that reductions in either
communication or learning costs lead to larger spans of control. But they do not allow us to exploit
the idea that decreases in communication and learning costs should have di⁄erent impacts on other
organizational variables such as the number of hierarchical layers or the knowledge acquired at each
layer.
3model as the basis for our empirical speci￿cations. In Section 4, we describe our
data. We report and discuss our main results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Earnings and Hierarchical Organization of U.S.
Lawyers, 1977-1992
2.1 Two Stylized Facts
We begin by describing the main patterns concerning earnings inequality and hierar-
chical organization in the law during this period.
1. Earnings inequality increased steadily between 1977 and 1992; this
increase was particularly large at the top of the earnings distribution.
Table 1 presents our estimates of various quantiles of the earnings distribution among
privately-practicing U.S. lawyers between 1977 and 1992. All ￿gures are in 1992
dollars. These estimates use con￿dential data from the Census of Services; the way
we construct these estimates di⁄ers somewhat by year, depending on the variables
the Census collects. We discuss the data and how we construct these estimates in
Section 4 below.
Earnings inequality among lawyers increased steadily during this time period, and
this increase was particularly large when comparing lawyers in the upper tail relative
to those at other quantiles. The ratio between the 95th percentile and median
earnings increased from 3.5 in 1977 to 4.8 in 1992. In contrast, the ratio between
75th percentile and median earnings was roughly constant. Figure 1 graphically
depicts earnings distributions for 1977 and 1992. Earnings were lower below the
80th percentile, and greater above the 80th percentile, in 1992 than in 1977.
The steadiness in the increase in earnings inequality is striking in light of large
￿ uctuations in earnings levels over time. These ￿ uctuations are correlated with the
business cycle, and thus the overall demand for lawyers, though they undoubtedly
re￿ ect changes in the number and composition of lawyers as well. Median real
earnings dropped by 20% between 1977 and 1982, and large decreases appear in the
other quantiles as well. Lawyers￿earnings then increased sharply between 1982 and
1987, with the median increasing by 20%, almost returning to the 1977 level. They
then decreased slightly between 1987 and 1992. The contrast between the consistent
4increase in earnings inequality and the ￿ uctuations of earnings levels during this
period is interesting, because it suggests that increases in inequality re￿ ect long-run
phenomena that are to some extent distinct from factors that can vary from period to
period. An explanation of increases in inequality that revolves only around changes in
the overall demand for lawyers￿services would have di¢ culty accommodating the fact
that earnings inequality has increased not only during booms but during recessions as
well: for example, not only between 1982 and 1987 but also between 1977 and 1982.
It is unlikely that changes in earnings inequality re￿ ect changes in the distrib-
ution of demands across areas of the law. A well-known phenomena during this
time is the "litigation explosion," which raises the issue of whether changes in the
demand for litigation and the supply of litigators could explain these trends. How-
ever, as we will show in greater detail later in the paper, earnings inequality increased
among lawyers in both litigation-intensive (e.g., negligence and insurance law) and
non-litigation intensive ￿elds. It also is unlikely that increases in earnings inequal-
ity re￿ ect other well-known ￿eld compositional changes. For example, demand for
merger and acquisition-related legal services was likely much higher in 1987 than in
1982 or 1992.7 But as noted before, earnings inequality increased both leading up to
and after this peak.
The earnings inequality patterns we ￿nd are consistent with well known ￿ndings
over the same period throughout other occupations (see Katz and Murphy, 1992)
and industries. Our work is the ￿rst one to be able to pair those ￿ndings with data
on changes in ￿rms￿hierarchical structure and thus can provide direct evidence on
the potential impact of the Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) type hypothesis that
earnings inequality and spans of control are closely related.8 We show next that the
preliminary evidence is encouraging: a second broad trend in legal services is that
lawyers￿hierarchical organization has changed over time. Speci￿cally, more lawyers
work in hierarchical teams and hierarchical teams have more associates per partners.
We state these two facts next.
7This is re￿ ected in changes in the ￿eld composition of lawyers as reported in our data: the share
of lawyers that specialize in either banking or corporate law was 10.2% in 1982, 16.8% in 1987, then
13.2% in 1992.
8In the conclusion we address the implications for the broader literature of our ￿nding that,
indeed, these two trends are connected.
52. Lawyers￿ hierarchical organization changed; a greater share of
lawyers worked in hierarchical teams, and the distribution of associates
across partners became more unequal. We classify lawyers into three cate-
gories: associates, unleveraged partners, and leveraged partners, where "unleveraged"
partners are partners who work in o¢ ces with no associates and "leveraged partners"
are partners who work in o¢ ces with at least one associate. Our data indicates that
the share of lawyers who worked as associates increased from 29% in 1977 to 40% in
1992, and the share of leveraged partners remained constant at around 40%. Thus,
the share of lawyers who worked in o¢ ces structured around hierarchical teams in-
creased from 70% to around 80%. In contrast, the share of lawyers who worked as
unleveraged partners, and thus in o¢ ces not structured around hierarchical teams,
decreased from about 40% to 30%.
Table 2 provides evidence on the distribution of "leverage" across lawyers. "Lever-
age" equals zero for associates and partners at o¢ ces with no associates and equals
the o¢ ce￿ s associate/partner ratio for partners at o¢ ces with at least one associate.
This measure is designed to re￿ ect how many lawyers work under a lawyer. This
table shows that leverage has increased on average and has tended to become more
unequal over time. The median leverage is zero throughout, while the 95th percentile
increased from 1.17 to 1.67, or 43%. The steady increase in earnings inequality across
lawyers, especially comparing lawyers at the top of the earnings distribution to other
lawyers, coincides with an increase in the leverage of the most leveraged lawyers.
2.2 Potential Explanations
The joint increase in earnings inequality and leverage is particularly striking in light of
large changes in the age distribution of lawyers during this time. One possible expla-
nation for these trends would revolve around changes in the lawyers￿skill distribution:
if the supply of younger, less experienced lawyers increased steadily relative to that
of over older, more experienced lawyers, one would expect both increases in leverage
and increases in earnings inequality simply because leverage has become cheaper over
time. However, changes in the age distribution of lawyers suggest that the opposite
is more likely to be the case. Table 3 indicates that the share of privately-practicing
lawyers who are 35 or younger decreased by 25% (from 45% to 35%) between 1980 and
61990, then decreased by another 20-25% during the 1990s.9 Earnings inequality and
leverage increased between the late 1970s and early 1990s despite the fact that the
number of young, inexperienced lawyers was declining relative to that of older, more
experienced lawyers. It is thus di¢ cult to explain changes in earnings inequality and
leverage during this time with a theory that relies only on changes in the experience
distribution of lawyers.
Two classes of explanations that can more easily reconcile these patterns are
changes in the organizational cost of leverage and skill-biased changes in clients￿
demands. If the organizational costs of working with associates declined steadily
over time, and the marginal bene￿ts of hiring associates is greater for more skilled
lawyers, one would expect leverage and earnings to increase disproportionately at
the top of their respective distributions over time. This would be true even if the
distribution of clients￿demand for skill stayed constant. Alternatively, if clients￿
demand for the most skilled lawyers increased steadily during this time relative to
that for less-skilled lawyers, one would expect steady increases in earnings inequality.
One would also expect leverage to increase, even if the organizational costs of working
with associates did not change.
An empirical goal of this paper is to shed light on these explanations. We will
estimate changes in the organizational cost of leverage ("coordination costs"), and
distinguish between changes in lawyers￿earnings distribution that are directly associ-
ated with changes in leverage versus changes in the market value of individual lawyers￿
time. This exercise directly illuminates the ￿rst of these explanations; for example,
we are able to assess how much less earnings inequality would be if leverage in 1992
was instead at 1977 levels. It indirectly illuminates the second of these explanations,
since changes in the market value of lawyers￿time re￿ ect not only any skill-biased
changes in demand, but also changes in the distribution of lawyers￿skills as well.
One possibility with respect to the latter is that decreases in coordination costs could
lead to a spreading out of the skill distribution by disproportionately increasing the
returns to human capital investment for the most skilled lawyers.
The next subsection places these changes in their institutional context, highlight-
9These ￿gures re￿ ect a large, well-known demographic bulge among lawyers that is also mani-
fested by time trends in the entry of new lawyers into the profession. New admissions to the bar
increased by 50% from 20,510 to 30,707 between 1971 and 1973, reached 42,756 in 1979, then stabi-
lized (Abel (1989), Table 21). Changes in the age distribution of lawyers since 1970 have re￿ ected
the entry and aging of these cohorts, which were far larger than those that preceded them.
7ing several important technological changes that a⁄ected how lawyers worked with
one another during our sample period.
2.3 Technological Change In Law O¢ ces, 1977-1992
Three new technologies had an important a⁄ect on how lawyers generated output
during this time: computer-aided legal research systems, word processors, and internal
email systems.
The commercialization and di⁄usion of computer-aided legal research systems
such as Lexis and Westlaw lowered lawyers￿cost of retrieving information. These
services were ￿rst o⁄ered in the mid-1970s. By the late 1970s many of the largest
￿rms subscribed to at least one of these services, which were usually accessed through
one or more dedicated terminals in the ￿rm￿ s o¢ ce. The cost of these services at
the time was very high (over $100/hour plus the price of leasing terminals) and the
coverage of the databases was limited, so very few small and medium-sized ￿rms chose
to subscribe themselves, although many lawyers at such ￿rms had access through
publically accessible law libraries. Decreases in the price of both the hardware and
these services and increases in their coverage led these services to become common in
all but the very smallest o¢ ces by the early 1990s, and they are currently available
as web-based applications.10 These services fundamentally changed how lawyers
conducted research. Before these services, lawyers depended on paper trails and the
memories of their colleagues to ￿nd the pertinent information they needed for their
work.
Document production changed during this time as well. At the start of the
period, practically all documents were typed by hand, often in duplicate, and the
physical copies were stored in lawyers￿case ￿les. This process changed, ￿rst with
the development of faster, cheaper photocopiers, then with the di⁄usion of word
processing machines starting in the early 1980s. These machines, which were highly
specialized computers, allowed lawyers (or, more precisely, their secretaries) to revise
documents without having to retype them entirely and to retain electronic copies of
any documents that they produced. The ability to revise documents without having
10Although Federal law databases were available on these services in the mid-1970s, state law
databases were added to these services gradually. Below we will describe how we exploit cross-state
di⁄erences in the availability of Lexis state law databases to examine whether the coordination cost
decreases we uncover are related to the di⁄usion of these services.
8to retype them entirely was valuable not just because it saved the time of retyping
documents, but also because it reduced the time spent checking documents since one
could focus attention on parts that had changed. The ability to maintain electronic
copies was extremely valuable to lawyers because it allowed them to easily reuse text.
Most lawyers had ￿les of forms that they used to construct standard documents, but
until documents were stored electronically, reusing text from previously-developed
documents required them to retrieve the hard copies and retype the relevant text
into the new document. PC-based word processing applications gradually replaced
specialized word processing machines throughout the 1980s. These o⁄ered similar
functionality, but were far cheaper, and extended these capabilities to smaller law
o¢ ces. The change in computing platform from specialized machines to PCs did not
immediately change how documents were produced in most cases; PCs at ￿rst simply
replaced specialized word processing machines on secretaries￿desks.11 By the early
1990s, word processing applications had been adopted at most law ￿rms, even small
ones, though they were not necessarily used directly by the lawyers themselves.
Finally, the way lawyers communicated with each other and with clients changed
as well. The most important change in intra-o¢ ce communication was the di⁄usion
of electronic mail, which occurred late in our sample period and primarily in the
largest o¢ ces. Personal computers became common on lawyers￿desks, ￿rst at large
￿rms, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Adoption of PCs by lawyers themselves gen-
erally coincided with the adoption of local area networks which linked these machines
together with each other and printers, and which supported intra-o¢ ce electronic
mail.12 Email not only provided a new way that lawyers could communicate with
each other, but also allowed them to more easily share and edit electronic versions
of documents. External communication changed throughout our sample period; fax
machines became common in law o¢ ces during the 1980s, and teleconferencing and
videoconferencing became more a⁄ordable throughout this period. Lawyers￿use of
email for external communication was uncommon until the mid-1990s commercializa-
tion of the internet, however.
11A 1985 Survey by Hildebrandt, Inc. reports that most large ￿rms had one or more PCs, but the
majority of these were used by secretaries and administrators.
12Staudt and Shiels (1994) provide evidence that by 1993, most lawyers in large ￿rms had personal
computers on or near their desks, and the vast majority of large law ￿rms had installed local area
networks. The di⁄usion of networked PCs was very rapid; in the mid-1980s, these were extremely
rare.
9Thus, technological change fundamentally altered how lawyers accomplished three
important tasks during this period. Each of these changes had their greatest initial
impact on large ￿rms ￿rst before di⁄using to smaller ones, but they took place at
di⁄erent points in time. Information retrieval improved starting in the late 1970s,
particularly for lawyers in states where on-line databases included state law as well
as Federal law. Document production changed starting in the early 1980s, and
intra-o¢ ce communication costs decreased starting in the late 1980s.
All of these changes decrease coordination costs. The impact of email and other
means of electronic communication on coordination costs is straightforward. More
subtly, the di⁄usion of computer-aided legal research decreased coordination costs by
reducing the degree to which associates relied on partners￿guidance to ￿nd relevant
material; the results of search queries provide associates guidance that sometimes
substitutes for partners￿expertise. Finally, the adoption of word processing applica-
tions diminished coordination costs by making it less costly for teams of lawyers to
edit and unify text that was drafted by di⁄erent individuals into a single document.
A broad consequence of these changes is that partners can delegate work to associates
more e¢ ciently than they could in the past, allowing for an increase in the leverage
of partner talent.
3 The Impact of Coordination Costs On Organi-
zation and Inequality: Theoretical Framework
3.1 Theoretical model
In this section, we study the equilibrium relationship between coordination costs,
organization, and earnings. To do this, we proceed in two steps. We ￿rst analyze
theoretically the impact of coordination costs on organization and earnings inequality
with the help of a simple equilibrium model. We then use the model to construct our
empirical speci￿cations.
We consider an environment where agents are endowed with one unit of time and
unidimensional skill z ￿ g(z); z 2 [z;z], z > 0: We measure this skill in dollar value
of output that an agent can produce when working on their own. We propose that
hierarchical teams allow agents to combine their knowledge with other agents￿time
as well as their own. Speci￿cally, we assume that the output of a hierarchical team
10with one manager of skill zm and n workers of skill zw is y = zmf(n(zw)), where n is
the number of workers, f(n) is the e⁄ective time in production the n + 1 individuals
spend, and f(0) = 1. We assume that managers￿span of control is limited by their
workers￿skill; increasing a manager￿ s span of control n requires them to delegate a
larger share of their team￿ s work, and this in turn requires them to have more-skilled
workers. To capture this relationship, we assume that n
0(zw) > 0.13
For estimation purposes, we further specify f(n) = (n + 1)￿, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. If
￿ < 1, then the e⁄ective time in production of the team is less than the agents￿time
endowment n + 1; ￿ parameterizes the coordination cost associated with hierarchical
production. Note that such costs do not exist if agents work on their own; if n = 0,
f(n(:)) = 1.14 Our hierarchical production function is thus:
y = zm(n(zw) + 1)
￿: (1)
In contrast, the output of these n+1 agents is zm +nzw if they worked on their own.
The bene￿t of hierarchical production is that the manager￿ s knowledge is applied
to others￿time as well as their own, and the team￿ s productivity per unit of time in
production is higher than when they work on their own. The drawback is that agents
spend a lower share of their time directly in production.
In Garicano and Hubbard (2007a), we set up and solve for the equilibrium of
this model, show that it exists, develop testable implications of this model and ￿nd
evidence in favor of these implications. Unlike in our previous work, this paper
uses the model as a maintained assumption throughout our empirical work. In what
follows, we only sketch the equilibrium construction; the only new results concern the
comparative statics, which bear on how changes in coordination costs a⁄ect earnings
inequality in equilibrium. The reader is directed to the companion paper for the rest
of the equilibrium proofs.
The organizational equilibrium in this model determines: (a) the allocation of
agents of skill z to positions ￿agents can become workers, managers, or "unleveraged"
individuals who do not work in a team, (b) the match between workers and managers,
including the number of workers with whom each manager works, and (c) agents￿
13See Garicano (2000) for a derivation of this condition from ￿rst principles in a problem solving
hierarchy.
14Although we label ￿ as "coordination costs," it includes any ine¢ ciency that arises when indi-
viduals work in teams but not when they work on their own, including for example agency costs.
11earnings. An equilibrium is de￿ned as an outcome in which no agent would be better
o⁄ by switching teams or positions. As discussed in our earlier work (see Garicano
and Hubbard, 2007a), the organizational equilibrium obtained in this model has the
following properties:
￿ Positive Sorting. More knowledgeable managers work with more knowledgeable
workers.
￿ Scale E⁄ects. More knowledgeable managers work with larger teams of workers.
￿ Strati￿cation. There exist thresholds (z1;z2) that partition agents into positions
according to their knowledge: agents with z < z1 are workers, agents with
knowledge z > z2 are managers, and those in between are "unleveraged."
Given these properties of the competitive equilibrium, to solve for the equilibrium
one must obtain a duple fz1;z2g 2 R+ such that all of the agents in [z;z1] are workers;
those in [z1;z2] are "unleveraged," and those in [z2;z] are managers; a matching
function m : [z;z1] ! [z2;z] that maps the skill of workers to the skill of the manager
they are assigned to; and a wage function w(z) for z 2 [z;z1] and an earnings function
R(z) for z 2 [z2;z] that determine the earnings of workers and managers, respectively;
such that: (i) each manager￿ s optimal choice of worker quality zw is the one prescribed
by the matching function, zm = m(zw); (ii) the matching function is such that the
supply and demand of workers is equalized at all points in the distribution of skill;
(iii) occupational choices are optimal.
Figure 2 depicts agents￿equilibrium earnings as a function of their skill in equi-
librium. The equilibrium earnings function is the outer envelope of curves that
characterize how much an agent with knowledge z would earn on their own, as a
worker, and as a manager. From the discussion above, the earnings of agents with
knowledge z and who work on their own (n = 0) equal R(z;0) = z. This is what in-
dividuals would earn, absent hierarchical production. The other two curves, R(z;n)
and w(z), are the outcome of a competitive labor market equilibrium. We next
sketch the construction of this competitive equilibrium, with an emphasis on the ob-
jects that we use in our estimation. We will use this characterization to obtain some
comparative statics results concerning the impact of changes in coordination costs on
equilibrium earnings and organization.
12Consider ￿rst condition (i) in the de￿nition above. For a given manager-worker
match zm = m(zw) to be optimal, the worker￿ s earnings must be such that it is optimal
for a manager with skill zm to be matched with workers of skill zw. Managerial




￿ ￿ n(zw)w(zw) (2)
where w(z) is the equilibrium wage function that relates workers￿earnings to their
skill, which we obtain below. A necessary condition in equilibrium is that each man-
ager chooses zw optimally given w(z); thus the ￿rst order condition:
￿zm(n(zw) + 1)




holds for each manager. The unknowns in this ￿rst order condition are w0(:) and
w(:): That is, the ￿rst order condition determines the di⁄erential equation in w that
must hold for managerial choices of worker skill to be optimal. This equation,
together with the terminal condition that the marginal worker is indi⁄erent between
being a worker or working on their own, w(z1) = z1, determines the wage function as
a function of the (to be determined) cuto⁄ z1; w(z;z1).
Note that for the purposes of our empirical estimation later, one can exploit the
invertibility of n(zw) and rewrite the ￿rst order condition (3) in terms of n as:
￿zm(n + 1)
￿￿1 = w(n) + w
0 (n)n (4)
which will allow us to characterize managers￿problem in terms of their demand for
leverage rather than their demand for skill.
Consider now equilibrium condition (ii) above, that supply and demand be equal
at all points in the distribution. Formally, writing managerial skill in terms of the







￿1(z))g(z)dz; 8 z ￿ z1; (5)
The left hand side is the supply of workers between z and z: The right hand side is
the demand of workers by the managers matched with these workers, that is by the
managers between z2 = m(z) and m(z). This integral equation implies a shape for
the matching function, which, together with terminal condition m(z1) = z (the best
13workers are matched with the best managers), results in the equilibrium matching
function m(z;z1):
We have now functions m(z;z1) and w(z;z1) that depend on the cuto⁄z1. To solve
for this cuto⁄ we have two conditions left. First, market clearing requires that the
least-skilled worker be matched with the least-skilled manager, m(z;z1) = z2: Second,
continuity of the overall earnings function requires that the least-skilled manager is
indi⁄erent between working on their own or being a manager, z2 = R(z2): These
functions and conditions imply a system of two equations with two unknowns that
fully characterizes the equilibrium. In the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix we show
that if a solution exists it is unique and further characterize the equilibrium.
Strati￿cation implies that the slopes of the segments of the overall earnings func-
tion are ordered in the way depicted in Figure 2 (the slope of the self employment
income is 1, the slope of the manager￿ s earnings function is (n + 1)￿ > 1 and the
slope of the wage function is w0(z) < 1): Thus occupational choices are optimal as
long as the overall earnings function is continuous, which we have ensured through
the conditions z2 = R(z2) and z1 = R(z1):
We are interested in studying the impact of a change in ￿ on equilibrium organi-
zation and inequality. Intuitively, an increase in ￿ increases the marginal bene￿t of
leverage, and thus must lead to an increase in managerial earnings and leverage as
managers seek to hire more workers. A ￿rst step to obtain this result as an equilib-
rium outcome is to characterize the impact of a change in ￿ on the share of managers
and workers in the economy.
Lemma 1 A decrease in coordination costs (an increase in ￿) increases the share of
workers (z1 increases) and the share of managers (z2 decreases) at the expense of a
reduction in the share of "unleveraged" agents.
Given the characterization of z1 and z2, the characterization of changes in inequal-
ity and organization in equilibrium is straightforward.
Proposition 2 (Coordination Costs) A decrease in coordination costs (an increase
in ￿) has the following e⁄ects on organization and inequality:
1. Organization: An increase in the proportion of workers (increase in z1) and
managers (decrease in z2) in the economy at the expense of a decrease in the
14proportion of self-employed. The increase in the number of workers is larger
than the increase in the number of managers. It also results in an increase in
the span of control (n) of each manager, as well as of the average manager,
where the last result takes into account the expansion in the share of managers
in the economy (that is, the least skilled manager is less-skilled than before).
2. Inequality: An increase in the return to skill for managers, R0(z), and in the
pay gap among managers [R(z) ￿ R(z2)]:
Our empirical work, which estimates how much the coordination cost parameter
￿ has changed over time for lawyers and assesses how much of the increase in earn-
ings inequality among lawyers re￿ ects changes in lawyers￿hierarchical organization,
provides quantitative evidence that bears on this proposition. In passing, we note
that the model above does not generate propositions regarding all possible measures
of earnings inequality. To see this, note that decreases in ￿ will lead to increases in
z1 and thus w(z); decreases in coordination costs will lead to earnings increases at
the bottom as well as the top of the earnings distribution, and earnings ratios that
compare the highest and lowest quantiles may or may not increase. Our proposition
is nevertheless useful for two reasons. One is that it illuminates the mechanism
through which coordination costs can lead inequality to increase: inequality can in-
crease both because of a direct impact on the returns to skill and through general
equilibrium e⁄ects that operate through the matching between workers and man-
agers. The other is that our primary empirical focus will be on lawyers at or above
median earnings, and the vast majority of these individuals are either unleveraged or
are leveraged partners, not associates. Our analysis will thus concentrate on parts of
the earnings distribution where the mechanism we describe in the proposition would
be generally expected to lead earnings inequality to increase in response to decreases
in coordination costs.
3.2 The Empirical Model
This subsection develops our empirical framework, which is the same as that in Gar-
icano and Hubbard (2007a). This framework centers around maximization problem
(2) and ￿rst order condition (4) and exploits the existence of an equilibrium wage func-
tion w(n), and consequently the invertibility of n(zw). Doing this requires adapting
15the theoretical model to our empirical context by introducing stochastic elements into
the model and accounting for inputs other than lawyers￿human capital.
3.2.1 Partners￿Maximization Problem and the Demand for Leverage
We specify a partner￿ s earnings in o¢ ce i as:
Ri(zmi;n) = b zmi(ni + 1)
￿ ￿ wi(ni)ni ￿ ci(ni) (6)
= "izmi(ni + 1)
￿ ￿ wi(ni)ni ￿ ci(ni)
This speci￿cation, which exploits the invertibility of n(zw), has two di⁄erences
from equation (2). One is that we introduce a stochastic shock, "i, to the partner￿ s
revenues. We assume that this is a short-run demand shock realized after the partner
chooses how many associates to hire; this re￿ ects that the fact that clients￿demands
for legal services are uncertain, and this leads to variation in revenues conditional
on the skills and size of the legal team. The timing of this shock implies that its
realization a⁄ects partners￿earnings but not the organizational equilibrium we depict
above. We assume that "i is i.i.d., positive, and E("i) = 1: The other di⁄erence is
the term ci(ni), which re￿ ects law o¢ ces￿costs other than associate pay. We defer a
discussion of the details of our speci￿cation of these costs, which include things such
as nonlawyer pay and overhead, until after we describe our data.
Partners choose n to maximize expected earnings, which produces the ￿rst order
condition:
￿zmi(ni + 1)
￿￿1 = w(ni) + w
0 (ni)ni + c
0
i(ni) (7)
Solving for zmi, substituting the expression into (6), then rearranging terms and
taking logs, we obtain:
ln




i(ni)ni + wi + c
0
i(ni)) = ￿ln￿ + ln"i (8)
lnARi ￿ lnMCi = ￿ln￿ + ln"i
where ARi and MCi are the average revenues per lawyer and the marginal cost of
leverage at o¢ ce i. The coordination cost parameter ￿ is thus identi￿ed by the
ratio between marginal cost and average revenue. If these quantities are equal on
average, this implies that hierarchical production is constant returns to scale in the
sense that there are no additional coordination costs associated with working with
16larger teams with greater associate-partner ratios. If marginal cost is much lower
than average revenues, in contrast, this implies that there are sharply diminishing
returns to leverage: hierarchical production involves considerable coordination costs
that reduce the time lawyers spend in production. How the parameter ￿ evolves
over time will be of particular empirical interest because it will a⁄ect our estimate
of how much increases in earnings inequality across lawyers re￿ ect organizational
improvements versus other factors.
Average revenues per lawyer at o¢ ce i is observed directly in our data, but the
marginal cost of leverage is not. We next turn to our speci￿cation of one of the
components of this cost, w0
i(ni).
3.2.2 The Marginal Price of Leverage
Our empirical speci￿cation of the function that relates associate earnings to leverage
aims to relax the deterministic relationship between these variables while preserving
the unidimensional sorting that characterizes the organizational equilibrium we depict
above. We specify wi(ni) as wi(n) = w(n)￿i, where ￿i is a mean one log-normally
distributed random variable. We interpret ￿i as a compensating di⁄erential that
accounts for di⁄erences in working conditions at o¢ ce i: this factor shifts up or down
all potential associates￿willingness to work at o¢ ce i. The wage-leverage surface
that partners at o¢ ce i face equals a market wage-leverage surface w(n) times an
additional term that leads associate pay to be particularly high or low, conditional
on the organization and skill of the lawyers at o¢ ce i.15 Suppressing controls, we let
lnw(n) = ￿0 + ￿1n + ￿2n2, so that
lnwi(n) = ￿0 + ￿1n + ￿2n
2 + ￿i (9)
The marginal wage w0(n) that partners at o¢ ce i confront is therefore (￿1n+￿2n2)wi(n).
We regress the log of associate earnings on a polynomial of n and use the coe¢ cient
estimates to construct an estimate of the marginal wage, [ w0
i(n), for each o¢ ce, which
we then substitute for w0
i(ni) in equation (8).
We allow for the possibility that associate earnings are systematically higher in
some markets than others and in some ￿elds than others by including county ￿xed
15If ￿i is independent of n, it must be independent of zm as well because zm and n move together
in equilibrium.
17e⁄ects and the ￿eld shares of lawyers in o¢ ce i as controls. We permit wi(n) to be
determined by more-narrowly-de￿ned labor markets by allowing the shape of w(n)
to di⁄er for o¢ ces that serve litigation versus non-litigation-related demands and
within the latter, that serve business versus individual demands. We have also
explored the possibility that it varies across di⁄erently-sized geographic markets, but
have not found evidence that this is the case. The speci￿cations we report below
therefore allow w0(n) to vary across broadly-de￿ned classes of demand, but not across
geographic markets.16
3.2.3 Discussion
Production Function Estimation and Hedonics Our empirical goal is to es-
timate the parameter ￿ of the hierarchical production function. Our methodology,
however, di⁄ers from usual production function estimation in how it treats human
capital. The usual approach is to measure labor or human capital in e¢ ciency units,
which implicitly assumes that the quality and quantity of human capital are perfect
substitutes. In contrast, our framework explicitly accounts for the possibility that
the quality and quantity of human capital are not perfect substitutes: knowledgeable
agents can solve problems that no number of less-knowledgeable agents can. We view
this as an important characteristic of the market we are studying. This aspect of
human capital a⁄ects equilibrium labor market outcomes by leading partners to bid
up the wages of more knowledgeable associates, and allows the marginal price of skill
to be increasing in skill rather than constant. Accounting for this aspect of human
capital intensive production allows us to better model and estimate the marginal cost
of leverage.
Our analytic framework accounts for this by exploiting close connections between
equilibrium assignment models and the hedonics literature (Rosen (1974)), both of
which revolve around the equilibrium matching between heterogeneous buyers and
sellers. The hierarchical production function that we propose, which has microfoun-
dations in organizational economics, implies an invertibility property that eliminates
the empirical problem of sorting on unobserved (to the econometrician) skill, a prob-
lem that arises even in unidimensional skill models. The problem is stated in terms of
the supply and demand for leverage, which we observe directly, rather than for skill,
16We have also included higher-order polynomial terms, but have found that this adds little
explanatory value.
18which we do not. In addition, our production function and data allow us to circum-
vent the usual identi￿cation problems that plague hedonic estimation by appealing
to an identi￿cation principle that is standard in the production function literature.
￿ can be thought of as a parameter that a⁄ects the demand for leverage. Epple
(1987) discusses the problems in ￿nding cost shifters that, in a hedonic equilibrium,
are independent of unobservables on the demand side. We can identify this parame-
ter from the ratio between the average bene￿t and marginal cost of leverage and our
production function implies that the average bene￿t of leverage is simply revenues
per lawyer, which we observe in our data.17
Biases and Their Likely Magnitude Our analytic framework assumes that
agents make decisions to maximize their current earnings, conditional on their knowl-
edge. This assumption produces a labor market equilibrium in which all partners face
the same wage-leverage surface (apart from the shift incorporated in ￿i), and therefore
the hedonic earnings regression uncovers a marginal price schedule that every partner
faces. This assumption is not innocuous in this context; in particular, it rules out
the possibility that agents￿decisions re￿ ect forward-looking objectives: for example,
associates might value working with more knowledgeable partners because doing so
would increase their future earnings through better training or client contacts. If
so, the marginal price schedule implied by our regression will understate the marginal
price of leverage that partners actually face. A partner who wants to hire slightly
more knowledgeable associates has to compete with a slightly-more skilled partner to
do so, and this would require this partner to o⁄er more when associates value working
with more knowledgeable partners than he or she would if they did not, because this
partner would have to compensate associates to forego any dynamic bene￿ts of work-
ing with a more-skilled partner. Under this alternative assumption, our estimates of
the marginal cost of leverage will be biased downward, and this will lead our estimate
of ￿ to be biased downward.18 Our counterfactuals will then understate the e⁄ect of
17See Garicano and Hubbard (2007a) for an extended discussion of the relationship between this
framework, the hedonics literature, and production function estimation.
18A similar downward bias would exist if part of the true marginal cost of an associate is the
expected value of any transfer from incumbent partners to associates once they are promoted. The
existence of such prizes would lead us to understate the marginal cost of leverage. As explained in
Garicano and Hubbard (2007a), we are skeptical of this view because it ignores the prospective client-
generation-related bene￿ts of promoting promising lawyers; from incumbent partners￿perspective,
it is probably not a cost to promote lawyers who are expected to be at least as productive as existing
19hierarchy on the earnings distribution, because we would mistakenly infer that coor-
dination costs eat up too much of its potential bene￿ts. As we discuss below and
in our earlier work, the practical e⁄ect of this bias turns out to be relatively small,
because the marginal price of leverage is generally a small part of the marginal cost
of leverage.
Another, more mechanical, bias arises because we estimate equation (8) using
OLS; applying Jensen￿ s inequality, E("i) = 1 implies E(ln"i) < 0, which implies that
our estimate of ￿ is biased upward. This bias is very small and is similar across years,
on the order of 0.02 relative to a mean value of 0.55-0.70.19
Our discussion of the results will not emphasize these biases, because account-
ing for them would have only a small e⁄ect on our estimates and even less on our
inferences, which are largely based on changes over time.
Competition and ￿ Our analytic framework assumes that legal services markets
are competitive, and thus the price that partners receive for their o¢ ce￿ s output does
not decline if they choose to leverage their skill by hiring more associates. This
assumption corresponds to the fact that legal services in general is a very unconcen-
trated industry; even the largest law ￿rms are quite small relative to the size of the
industry as a whole.20 Under this assumption, the ratio of average revenues and
marginal costs reveals diminishing returns to scale associated with coordination, not
downward-sloping demand curves. If, however, partners were not price takers, this
ratio would re￿ ect diminishing returns associated with downward-sloping demand
curves as well and our estimates of ￿ would overstate the contribution of coordination
costs to diminishing returns. This, in turn, would lead us to understate hierarchical
partners.
19We estimated the equation under the assumption that "i is distributed log-normally, exploiting
the fact that under log-nomality E("i) = 1 implies ln "i is distributed N(￿￿2=2;￿2). The magnitude
of the bias is then ￿￿2=2.
20To put this into perspective, Bureau of the Census (1996) reports that in 1992 the 50 largest
law ￿rms collectively accounted for only 9% of the industry￿ s revenues. Assuming that the industry
is segmented between ￿rms that serve individuals and ￿rms that serve businesses, and that all of
the largest law ￿rms serve only businesses, the national C50 increases only to 18% (since about
half of industry receipts are from businesses). Even this higher measure puts it among the least
concentrated business services industries; it is similar to the concentration levels of other services
businesses use such as commercial photography, employment agencies, and architectural services. It
is much higher than the C50s of some individual-oriented service industries use such as physicians
and dentists.
20production￿ s contribution to earnings inequality because we would be overstating the
extent to which coordination costs dissipate the bene￿ts from hierarchical produc-
tion. Cross-sectional comparisons between the actual earnings distribution and what
it would be absent hierarchical production will therefore provide a lower bound of the
e⁄ect of hierarchical production on earnings distributions in each year.
That said, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that lawyers in some more
narrowly-de￿ned geographic or product markets face downward-sloping demand curves,
and that this might have changed over time in ways that might explain our estimates
of how ￿ evolved during our sample period. For example, law o¢ ces in very small
markets might have faced downward-sloping demand curves early in our period be-
cause of a lack of local competition, but this may have become less true over time as
bigger-city law ￿rms began to serve small cities, sometimes through local branches.
Alternatively, large ￿rms based in large cities may have faced increasing competition
over time as ￿rms based in other large cities entered their home markets. Either of
these would lead our estimates of ￿ to increase over time, even if coordination costs
did not change. Therefore, ￿nding that changes in ￿ over time re￿ ect only small mar-
ket o¢ ces or large o¢ ces in large cities would give us pause, because such changes
could plausibly re￿ ect sources of diminishing returns other than coordination costs.
In contrast, ￿nding that changes in ￿ within these subsamples are no larger (or are
smaller) than changes in ￿ within subsamples that have faced high levels of com-
petition throughout our sample period ￿such as small ￿rms in large cities ￿would
indicate that the changes in ￿ that we uncover likely re￿ ect changes in coordination
costs rather than systematic changes in the shape of the demand curves partners face.
4 Data
Our analysis uses con￿dential law-o¢ ce-level data from the 1977, 1982, 1987, and
1992 Census of Services. These data include each o¢ ce￿ s revenues, employment,
and payroll as reported to the Internal Revenue Service for tax purposes. They
also include more detailed information collected by questions speci￿cally asked to law
o¢ ces. We observe the total number of lawyers, the number of associate lawyers, and
the number of nonlawyers that work out of the o¢ ce. We also observe "payroll by
occupation" ￿total payroll to associate lawyers and to nonlawyers ￿and thus observe
average associate pay and average nonlawyer pay at each o¢ ce. We observe the
21share of lawyers that work primarily in each of 13 ￿elds de￿ned by the Census (e.g.,
corporate law, tax law, domestic law) and the share of lawyers who work in multiple
￿elds ("general practitioners"). Finally, we observe the share of the o¢ ce￿ s revenues
that come from clients who are individuals versus businesses or governments. These
law-o¢ ce-level data are collected from a large sample of law o¢ ces which includes
nearly all law o¢ ces with at least 20 employees or that are part of multi-o¢ ce ￿rms,
plus a sample of other o¢ ces. All estimates reported in this paper are computed
using the Census￿sampling weights. The set of law o¢ ces that receives a survey form
for these data varies from year to year; therefore, our data are repeated cross-sections
rather than a panel.
Our main analysis in each year uses only data from o¢ ces legally organized as
partnerships or proprietorships, and not those legally organized as "Professional Ser-
vice Organizations" (PSOs) such as Professional Corporations. The reason for this is
that the Census asks respondents to classify lawyers according to how they are treated
for tax purposes; all lawyers at ￿rms organized as PSOs therefore are considered "as-
sociate lawyers," even though lawyers at such ￿rms distinguish among themselves in
the same way that lawyers at ￿rms legally organized as partnerships do. The analytic
framework we describe above requires data that distinguishes between partners and
associates, and therefore cannot directly utilize the observations of o¢ ces organized
as PSOs.21
4.1 Estimating Partners￿Earnings
The Census does not ask law ￿rms to report partners￿earnings. We therefore must
estimate this variable. This is straightforward in 1977 and 1982 because the Cen-
sus asks respondents to report their total expenses in these years, along with the
variables described above. We estimate partners￿earnings in each o¢ ce in these
years as just the di⁄erence between revenues and operating expenses, divided by the
21We do not believe that this leads to any signi￿cant selection issues. PSOs were introduced by
states to allow the fringe bene￿ts lawyers and other professionals pay themselves to have same tax
advantages as those they pay employees. While ￿rms￿legal form of organization varies systematically
across states (corresponding to di⁄erences in when di⁄erent states began to allow PSOs), conditional
on state, there is not a strong relationship between ￿rms￿LFO and observables such as o¢ ce size
and lawyers￿￿elds. This is re￿ ected in the fact that in 1992, ￿rms organized as PSOs made up
about 1/3 of the industry measured in terms of either lawyers, o¢ ces, and revenues. (Garicano and
Hubbard (2007b))
22number of partners.22 Estimating partners￿earnings is less straightforward in 1987
and 1992 because the Census did not ask respondents to report operating expenses.
Although we observe payroll, we do not observe fringe bene￿ts or non-payroll-related
operating expenses ("overhead"), the most important components of which for law
o¢ ces include rental and lease payments, communication, o¢ ce supplies, and "pass-
through" expenses that are billed at cost to clients such as travel expenses or charges
for non-lawyer experts such as engineers (e.g., for patent cases) or economists (e.g.,
for antitrust cases). For partnerships and proprietorships, the di⁄erence between
revenues and payroll ￿which we can compute directly ￿equals the sum of partner
earnings, fringe bene￿t expenses, and overhead.
We estimate partners￿earnings for 1987 and 1992 using the same method as in
Garicano and Hubbard (2007a). We exploit the fact that (a) for ￿rms organized
as PSOs, the di⁄erence between revenues and payroll equals the sum of fringe ben-
e￿t expenses and overhead, since payroll includes the earnings of all lawyers (and
nonlawyers), and (b) fringe bene￿ts are consistently about 15% of payroll at law of-
￿ces Our estimate of overhead at o¢ ces organized as PSOs is therefore (revenues -
1.15*payroll). Using these o¢ ces, we regress our overhead estimate on characteristics
of the o¢ ce, including revenues, the number of people in the o¢ ce, lawyers￿￿elds,
and local market size, allowing the relationships between overhead and revenues to be
nonlinear and di⁄erent across lawyers￿￿elds, and allowing the relationship between
overhead and the number of people in the o¢ ce to di⁄er with local market size (per-
haps because o¢ ce space is more expensive in larger markets). We then use the
coe¢ cient estimates from this regression to generate predicted values for overhead
for each of our partnerships and proprietorships. Finally, we generate estimates of
partner pay for each of our partnerships and proprietorships by subtracting the sum
of estimated overhead and 1.15*payroll from the o¢ ce￿ s revenues, and dividing by the
number of partners. This procedure produces estimates of partner pay analogous to
those generated from the 1977 and 1982 data.
This procedure generates the earnings distributions we reported in Table 1 and
discussed earlier. We have compared these distributions to those generated from
other sources, in particular lawyer-level earnings data from the Census￿Public Use
22Capital expenditures, which are very small in this industry, are treated as part of partner
earnings. Since partners are the residual claimants on law ￿rms￿assets, this treatment seems
appropriate.
23Microdata Sample (PUMS). We report earnings distributions from the 1970, 1980,
1990, and 2000 PUMS in Table A1 in the Appendix. Although direct comparisons
are impossible because the PUMS data come from di⁄erent years than our data and
because the PUMS data are top-coded, the distributions exhibit consistent patterns.
In particular, the level and general time trend (in particular, low real earnings circa
1980-1982, higher real earnings before and after) in earnings are similar for the two
series.
4.2 Overhead
The structure of law o¢ ces￿overhead expenses exhibits a few interesting trends.
In Table 4, we report coe¢ cient estimates from regressions that relate overhead to
observables.23 The 1987 and 1992 estimates use PSOs; these are the estimates we use
to generate partner earnings for these years. The 1977 and 1982 speci￿cations use
our main sample of partnerships and proprietorships (since we can estimate overhead
directly for this sample for these years). The estimates indicate that while overhead
is related to revenues in all years, the relationship between overhead and employment
has tended to become stronger over time, especially for o¢ ces in very large cities and
especially between 1987 and 1992. We suspect that this re￿ ects, in part, changes in
law o¢ ces￿technology. From our earlier discussion, personal computers started to
appear on lawyers￿desks only in the late 1980s, and the early adopters of these and
complementary hardware tended to be large, big-city law o¢ ces. If so, it would not
be surprising to ￿nd that the relationship between overhead and employment tended
to become stronger in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially for o¢ ces in large
cities.
The relationship between overhead, revenues, and employment bears on our esti-
mation of equation (8). As noted above, part of the marginal cost of leverage consists
of costs other than increases in associate pay, c0
i(ni). We specify ci(ni), as:
ci(ni) = (xili + ohi)=pi
= xi(1 + ni) + ohi=pi
23This summary table does not report all of the coe¢ cients in these speci￿cations, for example
those on o¢ ce￿ s ￿eld shares and interactions between ￿eld shares and revenues. The full set of
results for each year are available upon request from the authors.
24where xi is nonlawyer pay per lawyer, li is the number of lawyers in o¢ ce i, ohi
is overhead at o¢ ce i, and pi is the number of partners at o¢ ce i. We assume
that nonlawyer pay per lawyer is constant: hiring an additional associate implies a
proportionate increase in the o¢ ce￿ s support sta⁄. Thus:
c
0
i(ni) = xi + oh
0
i=pi
From each partner in o¢ ce i￿ s perspective, an additional associate implies an increase
in nonlawyer pay of xi and an increase in overhead of oh0
i=pi: xi is observed in the
data. We use the coe¢ cient estimates on employment in the results reported in
Table 4 to construct an estimate of oh0
i=pi for each o¢ ce.
Finally, we note that our production function speci￿cation must account for the
fact that the marginal bene￿ts of leverage from a partner￿ s perspective are not simply
marginal revenues, but rather marginal revenues, net of the overhead associated with
these revenues. We therefore adjust revenues for each o¢ ce downward by (1 ￿ b ki),
where b ki is the estimated derivative of overhead with respect to revenues for o¢ ce i
implied by the estimates in Table 4.
The production function speci￿cation is therefore:
ln
￿
[Ri + wini + ci(ni)]
(ni + 1)




i=pi) = ￿ln￿+ln"i (10)
where \ w0
i(ni) is derived from our estimates of equation (9), presented below in Table
5, and b ki and c oh0
i are derived from our estimates in Table 4.24
5 Results
5.1 Associate Earnings and Leverage
Table 5 summarizes the coe¢ cient estimates of equation (9); the speci￿cations also
include county ￿xed e⁄ects and "o¢ ce class" dummies. The omitted ￿eld is "general
practice." The patterns in the ￿eld controls are fairly consistent across years and
24Inserting predicted values on the left side of the speci￿cation introduces a source of bias to our
estimates of ￿, once again because of Jensen￿ s inequality (e.g., because E[ln(MCi)] < ln[E(MCi)]).
As above we do not account for this bias directly in our estimation because we believe it to be small
and consistent across time.
25show some expected patterns; for example, associate pay is relatively high at o¢ ces
with a high share of corporate, tax law, or patent law specialists. Another notable
pattern is that 1982 looks di⁄erent than the other years for some specialized ￿elds.
Unlike other years, associate pay was not signi￿cantly higher at o¢ ces with high
shares of banking, insurance, or negligence-defense specialists relative to those with
high shares of general practitioners. This suggests that the returns to specialization
were lower in this recessionary year than in other years, at least for some ￿elds.
The coe¢ cients of interest are those that relate associate earnings to associate-
partner ratios; these are the polynomial coe¢ cients at the top of the table. These
coe¢ cients are hard to interpret as presented; we therefore present additional evidence
at the bottom of the table. There we report the di⁄erence between predicted percent
di⁄erence of associate earnings at o¢ ces with associate-partner ratios of 1.5 and
0.5; the vast majority of lawyers work at o¢ ces with associate-partner ratios in this
range. In general, the coe¢ cient estimates imply that w(n) di⁄ers across di⁄erent
classes of o¢ ces. The function is upward-sloping for all years for business non-
litigation o¢ ces, and the predicted increase in associate earnings when moving from
an associate-partner ratio of 0.5 to 1.5 is 4% in 1977 and 10-15% in the other years.
This pattern is similar, but muted, for litigation o¢ ces; the predicted increase is
4-7% in three of the years and slightly less than zero in the fourth. In contrast,
w(n) is essentially ￿ at in three of the years (and downward-sloping in the other) for
individual, non-litigation o¢ ces. The di⁄erence in w(n) between this segment and
the other segments may re￿ ect that, from the perspective of partners in this segment
of the industry, the quality and quantity of associates are more easily substitutable.
5.2 The Bene￿ts and Costs of Leverage
We summarize some of the implications of these and our other estimates to date
in Table 6. Here we depict how, from the perspective of partners, the marginal
bene￿ts and marginal costs have evolved over time. On average, partners worked in
o¢ ces where revenues per lawyer were $195,000 in 1977; this declined then increased
during our sample period. The average bene￿t of leverage, which is this ￿gure less
the share of revenues that is overhead, exhibits a similar pattern. The average
bene￿ts of leverage for 1992 partners were about 30% greater than those of 1977
partners. The marginal cost of leverage, averaged across partners in each year,
26exhibits a somewhat di⁄erent pattern. It decreased slightly between 1977 and 1982,
then increased substantially between 1982 and 1992. The marginal cost of leverage
for 1992 partners was about 50% greater than that of 1977 partners. As noted above,
the coordination cost of hierarchies is identi￿ed by the ratio between the marginal
cost and average bene￿t of leverage, evaluated at equilibrium quantities. Table 6,
which indicates that the marginal cost increased relative to the average bene￿t of
leverage between 1977 and 1992, presages our ￿nding that the coordination cost of
leverage has declined over time.
The right part of Table 6 depicts how the composition of marginal costs have
evolved. Associate pay has ￿ uctuated, but is a smaller share of the marginal cost
of leverage over time, declining from 53% to 45%. Overhead, in contrast, increases
both in its magnitude and its share of the marginal cost of leverage, rising from a
negligible share in 1977 to 13% of the average partner￿ s marginal costs in 1992. The
marginal price of leverage, which re￿ ects the possibility that hiring more associates
means hiring better associates, is a small, though increasing, part of the marginal cost
of leverage for the average partner in each year. This low average masks considerable
heterogeneity across o¢ ces, but cases where the marginal price of leverage exceeds
$10,000 are rare simply because n is low in this industry. While it is important
to account for these other components, the payroll-related costs of an additional
associate make up most of the marginal cost of leverage for most partners.
5.3 The Coordination Costs of Hierarchies
Table 7 presents our estimates of equation (10), and the average predicted value of
￿ that these coe¢ cient estimates imply. From the bottom of the table, on average,
￿ steadily increased between 1977 to 1992 from 0.57 to 0.71. From the perspective
of the average partner, hiring one￿ s ￿rst associate increased the time that the (now
2-person) team would spend in production by about one-half in 1977, but by about
two-thirds in 1992. The real team size after hiring an associate would have increased
from 1 to 2 individuals in both periods; the e⁄ective team size would have increased
from 1 to 2:57 = 1:48 individuals in 1977 and to 2:71 = 1:63 in 1992, about 30% more.
The fact that the coordination costs associated with hierarchical production declined
steadily during this time is interesting, because it indicates that the overall decline
cannot be solely attributed to technological changes that took place only in some of
27these subperiods. In particular, this pattern cannot be solely due to the di⁄usion of
personal computers within law ￿rms, which was important only in the ￿nal subperiod
in our sample, 1987-1992. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the
steady di⁄usion of a series of new applications lowered coordination costs during this
period, starting with computer-aided legal research in the late 1970s.
Table 8 provides evidence on the hypothesis that changes in ￿ re￿ ect changes in
the slope of the demand curves that partners face rather than coordination costs.
Here we report average predicted values of ￿, by year, for cells that are de￿ned by
the number of partners in the o¢ ce and the employment size of the county in which
the o¢ ce is located. These predicted values are generated from production function
speci￿cations that include dummy variables for each of these cells.25 The general
pattern that this table reveals is that ￿ increased during this period in all of our
o¢ ce size*market size cells, though it tended to increase somewhat more for smaller
o¢ ces than larger o¢ ces. The latter implies a convergence of sorts; the ￿gures in the
￿rst column indicate that ￿ was higher for larger o¢ ces than smaller o¢ ces in 1977,
but varied little with o¢ ce size in 1992. The trends across market size and o¢ ce
size*market size categories do not support the hypothesis that changes in ￿ over time
re￿ ect changes in competition that partners face. From the top panel, the changes
in ￿ for o¢ ces in small markets were no larger than changes in ￿ for o¢ ces in large
markets; it does not appear that overall changes in ￿ re￿ ect that partners in small
market ￿rms faced increasing competition over time, since this would imply that ￿
should increase more for small market o¢ ces than large market o¢ ces. Changes in ￿
for small o¢ ces in large markets were, if anything, larger than changes in ￿ for large
o¢ ces in large markets. Partners in small o¢ ces in large markets likely faced strong
competition throughout this period, but ￿ decreased by more for such partners than
for their large o¢ ce counterparts. We therefore conclude that the changes in ￿ that
we uncover are likely to re￿ ect changes in coordination costs during this period, not
changes in competition. This is not particularly surprising; as described earlier, most
lawyers likely faced strong competition from other lawyers throughout our sample
period.
25We do not report the coe¢ cient estimates from these speci￿cations for brevity; they are available
upon request from the authors.
285.4 Evidence on Coordination Costs and Lexis
We investigate whether the decreases in coordination costs we uncover above are
related to the di⁄usion of computer-aided legal research by exploiting the fact that
state materials were added to Lexis libraries gradually, and some states￿materials were
added earlier than others. Lexis was thus more valuable for lawyers in some states
than others during certain periods. We therefore investigate whether patterns in
coordination costs are correlated with the timing of the availability of state materials:
did ￿ decrease earlier in states where state materials were available earlier? In
particular, we examine whether ￿ was systematically lower in 1982, but not in 1977
or 1987, in states where materials were available early than late.
We obtained data on the timing of Lexis availability by examining documents
from the ￿les of Robert Asman, President of the Ohio State Bar Association Auto-
mated Research.26 A series of documents from the mid-1970s-early 1980s, including
contracts and promotional materials, allow us to observe what was available on Lexis
at di⁄erent points in time. The state materials on Lexis during this period typically
included the decisions of the states￿Supreme Court and important Courts of Appeals.
Lexis would typically try to make available these decisions for at least the previous
15-20 years (going back to somewhere in the 1950s or 1960s); once this was achieved,
it would move on to other states. Lexis generally added larger states earlier, as
potential demand was greater in these states.
We were able to obtain availability at several points in time; we count a state
as having availability if state Supreme Court decisions are available for at least the
previous ten years. By June 1974, materials were available for Missouri, Ohio, and
New York. By November 1976, they were available for eight more states: California,
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas. We
will refer to these 11 states as the "early" states and the rest as the "late" states.27
Eleven more states were available by August 1979; all 50 states were available by
1982.
The top panel of Table 9 provides some initial results from this exercise. The
variable "early Lexis state" equals one if the law o¢ ce is located in an early state
26These ￿les are maintained in the Case Western University Law Library; thanks to Kathleen
Carrick for providing us access to them.
27We experimented with dividing states into four categories rather than two, and found that results
were similar for the two "early" categories and for the two "late" ones; we therefore combined them.
29and zero if it is located in a late state. The coe¢ cient on this variable is negative
and signi￿cant in each of our sample years; however, there is no evidence that it is
particularly large in 1982 relative to the surrounding years. These regressions thus
provide no support for the proposition that declines in coordination costs are related
to the availability of Lexis materials.
The bottom panel contains some more detailed results that distinguish between
large and small law o¢ ces; although Lexis tried to market its service to small law
o¢ ces (through the availability of public terminals priced on a per use basis), it is
clear that most adoption of the service was by larger law o¢ ces. We therefore create
a dummy that equals one if the o¢ ce has at least 10 partners and zero otherwise,
and include interactions between this variable and the "early" dummy to investigate
whether there is a di⁄erence in ￿ between large law o¢ ces in early and late states in
1982 but not before or after. Table 9 provides evidence that this is indeed the case.
The coe¢ cient on the "early Lexis state*at least 10 partners" interaction is negative
and signi￿cant in 1982, but close to zero and not statistically signi￿cant in 1977
or 1987. Looking across large law o¢ ces, coordination costs declined in early states
relative to late states between 1977 and 1982; late states then caught up between 1982
and 1987. There is thus some evidence that some of the decreases in coordination
costs in Table 7 are related to the di⁄usion of computer-aided legal research.
While this pattern is interesting, it is important to recognize that the evidence that
it provides is not conclusive. The "early" states tend to be states that contain the
cities with the most lawyers in the country: New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago,
etc. Absent detailed ￿rm- or o¢ ce-level data on adoption, it is unlikely that we
can provide evidence against alternative hypotheses in which other factors lowered
coordination costs for large law o¢ ces in states with large cities in 1982 but not before
or after.28 We see the results in Table 9 as suggestive of connections between the
availability of new information technology and coordination costs (and therefore to
increases in lawyers￿earnings inequality), but more detailed data are necessary to
establish these connections de￿nitively.
28We have, however, examined whether this pattern is merely a big city e⁄ect by investigating
whether it holds when dummying out o¢ ces in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Houston,
and San Francisco. The pattern persists even when doing so.
305.5 "Hierarchy-Free" Earnings Distributions
In this section we construct and report estimates of Ri(zmi;0): what lawyers would
earn, if they were unleveraged. We refer to the distribution of Ri(zmi;0) across
lawyers as the "hierarchy-free" earnings distribution, and compare it to lawyers￿ac-
tual earnings distribution to infer the e⁄ect of hierarchical organization on earnings
inequality. We emphasize that our analysis on this front is a partial equilibrium
analysis, because this counterfactual holds constant the distribution of lawyers￿skills
as well as the match between clients and law ￿rms. If lawyers, in fact, did not or-
ganize hierarchically, this would a⁄ect lawyers￿investments in skills and the match
between clients and lawyers.
We estimate "hierarchy-free" earnings distributions in the following way. For
unleveraged partners, estimating Ri(zmi;0) is simple: these lawyers￿"hierarchy-free"
earnings equal their actual earnings. For leveraged partners, Ri(zmi;0) = b zmi￿ci(0),
where b zmi = TRi=(ni + 1)
b ￿i and ci(0) = xi + c ohi=pi. One can think of the ￿rst of
these components, b zmi, as the market value of the partners￿(unleveraged) time; cross-
lawyer di⁄erences in this component would re￿ ect, in part, di⁄erences in lawyers￿skill
but not di⁄erences in organization. The second of these components is what lawyers￿
costs would be if they were unleveraged; these costs include the cost of nonlawyer
support sta⁄ and overhead. For associates, we assume that Ri(zmi;0) = wi: their
earnings if unleveraged equal what they earn as associates. Revealed preference ar-
guments imply that associates￿actual earnings should overstate their "hierarchy-free"
earnings; in a model where individuals choose where to work to maximized their in-
come, individuals who choose to be associates should earn more as associates than
they would as unleveraged partners. Our estimates of "hierarchy-free earnings dis-
tributions" thus probably overstate lawyers￿hierarchy-free earnings, especially below
the median. This assumption will have a minimal e⁄ect on our main analysis, how-
ever, which focuses on quantiles at or above the median. It is important to include
associates in the analysis of earnings distributions, but overstating their "hierarchy-
free" earnings slightly will not a⁄ect our analysis as long as these individuals tend to
be below the median in the "hierarchy-free" earnings distributions that we compute.
Table 10 reports quantiles of the hierarchy-free earnings distributions in each of
our years. This table is analogous to the earnings distributions we reported in
Table 1, which we reproduce in the top panel of this table for comparison. The most
31important ￿nding in this table is that inequality increases over time in the "hierarchy-
free" earnings distribution, just like it does in the realized earnings distribution. The
ratio between the 90th and 50th quantile increased from 2.4 to 2.8, and that between
the 95th and 50th increased from 3.0 to 3.6 between 1977 and 1992. This ￿nding
indicates that increases in earnings inequality over time are not solely due to the
degree to which lawyers are leveraged; even taking out the e⁄ect of increases in
leverage, inequality increased substantially among lawyers above the median.
Before continuing, we note that we have characterized this result carefully. The
results in Table 10 do not rule out the possibility that all of the increase in earn-
ings inequality could be due to decreases in the coordination costs associated with
hierarchical production. If increases in ￿ lead highly-skilled lawyers to accumulate
more skill, this would be re￿ ected by changes the hierarchy-free earnings distribution.
The "pure leverage" e⁄ect to which we refer above is a lower bound of the impact of
changes in ￿ on earnings inequality, because it does not include the e⁄ect of human
capital investments that are responses to these changes.
Another ￿nding in Table 10 echoes Garicano and Hubbard (2007a): hierarchical
production ampli￿es earnings inequality. All of the earnings quantile ratios in the
top panel are greater than those in the bottom panel, and the di⁄erences between
the top and bottom panels are greater when the ratios involve higher quantiles. Our
previous work showed this for 1992; here we show that similar conclusions hold for
other years.
5.6 Organizational Changes and Increases in Earnings In-
equality
Table 11 analyzes the extent to which increases in organizational leverage contributed
to increases in earnings inequality between 1977 and 1992 through a decomposition
of changes in the quantile ratios. The top panel uses law o¢ ces in all segments. The
￿rst column reports that the ratio between the 90th percentile and median earnings
increased by 0.20 log points; in contrast, this ratio increased by 0.16 log points when
using our estimates of the hierarchy free earnings distributions in these years. The
di⁄erence between the two, here called the "residual change in earnings inequality,"
depicts the change in earnings ratios that is attributable to changes in lawyers￿lever-
age. The ￿nal row reports this as a share of the change in the earnings quantile ratio.
32From the table, we estimate that 17% of the change in the 90th/50th percentile ratio
during this time is due to changes in lawyers￿leverage. This ￿gure is greater when
examining ratios that focus more on the upper tail: we estimate that 38% of the
increase in the 95th/50th percentile ratio, and 69% of the increase in the 95th/90th
percentile ratio, is due to changes in lawyers￿hierarchical organization.
Increases in organizational leverage thus explain the majority of the increase in
earnings inequality among very top lawyers. They explain a substantial, but moder-
ate amount of the increase in inequality between lawyers at the top of the distribution
and the median lawyer. Most of the earnings inequality increase between top lawyers
and the median lawyer is accounted for instead by di⁄erential changes in the market
value of lawyers￿time. Some of these di⁄erential changes may have organizational
roots. Declines in the coordination costs of hierarchical production may have led
the most skilled lawyers to increase their human capital disproportionately relative
to other lawyers. These numbers are therefore likely to be a lower bound on the
e⁄ect of declines in coordination costs on earnings inequality during this time.
The bottom panel reports a similar analysis, conducted separately for lawyers in
"business, non-litigation," "litigation," and "individual, non-litigation" o¢ ces. The
qualitative results for lawyers in "business, non-litigation" and "litigation" o¢ ces are
similar to each other and to the results in the top panel: changes in leverage explain a
large share of the increase in inequality among lawyers in the upper tail of the distri-
bution, and a moderate share of the increase in inequality between these lawyers and
the median lawyer. The e⁄ect of changes in leverage on earnings inequality among
top lawyers is particularly pronounced among lawyers in "business, non-litigation"
o¢ ces (e.g., o¢ ces that do transactional work for business clients but not litigation):
over three-quarters of the change in the 95th/90th percentile earnings ratio is ac-
counted for by changes in leverage, but none of the increase in the 90th/50th ratio.
The results for lawyers in "individual, non-litigation" o¢ ces di⁄er from those in other
o¢ ces. Inequality increased substantially among lawyers in this segment during this
time, especially comparing lawyers in the upper tail to those in the middle. But
we ￿nd little evidence that this increase re￿ ects changes in leverage: changes in the
"estimated earnings, absent hierarchical production" ratios are similar in magnitude
to changes in the estimated earnings ratios.
335.7 Productivity Decompositions
Our ￿nal set of results investigate changes in lawyers￿productivity between 1977-
92, as measured by revenues per lawyer, in light of the decline in coordination costs
that took place during this time. Our analytic framework, and in particular the
hierarchical production function that we propose, facilitates this analysis by positing
that output is simply the product of skill and time: partner skill multiplied by the
time lawyers in the o¢ ce spend in production.
Dividing both sides of equation (1) by ni+1, we obtain an expression for revenues
per lawyer at o¢ ce i:
yi=(ni + 1) = zmi(ni + 1)
￿￿1 = zmisi
where si = (ni+1)￿￿1, the share of lawyers￿time that is spent directly in production.
O¢ ce-level productivity increases therefore can either re￿ ect increases in partner skill
or increases in lawyers￿time-e¢ ciency.
Average revenues per lawyer across all o¢ ces is therefore:
yi=(ni + 1) = zmisi
= zm s + cov(zmi;si)
where the covariance and means are calculated using the number of lawyers in the
o¢ ce as weights. Our analytic framework and results imply that the covariance
term should be negative: more skilled partners are more leveraged, but if ￿ < 1 this
lowers the share of time that lawyers spend directly in production. One can therefore
decompose changes in average revenues per lawyer in the following way:
￿yi=(ni + 1) = ￿zm st + ￿s zm;t￿1 + ￿cov(zmi;si)
The ￿rst term is the change in the average value of skill that is applied to lawyers￿
time, holding lawyers￿time e¢ ciency constant. The second is the change in the share
of lawyers￿time spent in production, holding the average value of skill constant. The
third is the change in the covariance between skill and time e¢ ciency.
We report our results in Table 12. Real revenues per lawyer increased by $46,000
between 1977 and 1992; this measure of productivity therefore increased by just over
25% during our sample period. The decomposition indicates that none of the pro-
ductivity increase is accounted for by increases in lawyers￿time e¢ ciency. Although
34coordination costs decreased during this period, lawyers responded to this by increas-
ing leverage in a way that left lawyers￿average time e¢ ciency unchanged. In contrast,
all of the productivity increase is accounted for by increases in the average value of
skill that is applied to lawyers￿time. Even though the direct e⁄ect of reductions
in coordination costs are to increase lawyers￿time e¢ ciency, lawyers￿aggregate re-
sponse to these reductions ultimately exploited the input that is a source of increasing
returns rather than the input that is not; skill rather than time.
6 Conclusion
Labor economists have long been concerned with the mechanisms behind the increases
in earnings inequality since the late 1970s.29 The literature has concluded that the
phenomenon is primarily the consequence of changes in the demand for skill rather
than changes in the supply of skill. It has also tentatively concluded that technological
changes, rather than trade, are the likely culprits. Recently, some authors have
argued that scale e⁄ects along the lines of those examined in Rosen (1981, 1982) have
disproportionately a⁄ected earnings at the very top of the distribution by allowing
individuals to exploit better increasing returns associated with their skill.30
In this paper we analyze data from U.S. lawyers between 1977-1992 and provide
evidence on how changes in the ability of individuals to exploit increasing returns as-
sociated with their skill have contributed to earnings inequality in this industry. We
￿nd that the coordination costs associated with hierarchical production diminished
signi￿cantly during this period, and that increases in associate-partner ratios during
this time account for about two-thirds of the increase in earnings inequality among
very top lawyers, but a much smaller share of the increase in earnings inequality
between top lawyers and other lawyers. Preliminary evidence indicates that these
changes in organizational costs may be related to availability of computer-aided legal
research services such as Lexis. However, more detailed data are necessary to es-
tablish this ￿rmly and to investigate the particular paths through which declines in
various classes of information costs have a⁄ected organization and inequality in this
29See notably Katz and Murphy (1992).
30Garicano and Rossi-Hasberg (2006) show that improvements in communication technology ex-
pand e⁄ective team size and increase the reach of hierarchy; Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that
changes in ￿rm size (as given by market capitalization) can account for most of the recent expansion
of executive pay among very large ￿rms.
35industry.
We see this paper as contributing to the understanding of the organizational under-
pinnings of changes in labor market outcomes. Our evidence highlights that changes
in external and internal labor markets are closely related; understanding changes in
what have traditionally been considered external labor market outcomes is likely to
require studying how the demand and organization of skill and time changes inside
￿rms. While law o¢ ces are an unusually clean laboratory, given o¢ ces￿small size
and comparable organizational structures, future studies in other industries with more
organizationally complex ￿rms should allow for further insights, in particular by al-
lowing for an analysis of changes in the number of hierarchical layers in ￿rms, which
we could not measure in our data as most law ￿rms (and our data) distinguish only
between partners and associates.
7 Appendix
Proof. Recall that the equilibrium construction above results in two equations in two
unknowns. First, solving the market clearing condition (5), yields m(z) = ￿(z) + C
for some increasing and continuous function ￿(:): We eliminate the constant by
substituting m(z1) = z, so that we have C = z ￿ ￿(z1); and thus m(z) = ￿(z) + z ￿
￿(z1): We then substitute the other threshold matching condition m(z) = z2, yielding
z2 + ￿(z1) = ￿(z) + z, which contains only two unknowns, the thresholds z1 and z2.
Second, indi⁄erence of the marginal manager implies R(z2) = z2. The system of
equations we must characterize can thus be written as:
z2 + ￿(z1) = ￿(z) + z (11)
z2(n(z) + 1)
￿ ￿ n(z)w(z;z1) = z2 (12)
where w(z;z1) is a function of z1 but not of z2 (to see this, note that w(z) is obtained
by substituting m(zw) = ￿(zw) + z ￿ ￿(z1) for zm in (3) together with w(z1) = z1;
none of these are functions of z2).
Consider ￿rst (11). Since ￿
0 > 0; (11) de￿nes a market clearing function zm
2 (z1)
with dzm
2 =dz1 < 0: Intuitively, if more workers are used (z1 increases), more managers
are needed (z2 decreases). Second, de￿ne w = w(z;z1); and notice that (12) implies
36z0
2(w) > 0: Since dw(z;z1)=dz1 > 0; 31 (12) implies a second function zr
2(z1) with
dzr
2=dz1 > 0: Intuitively, suppose z1 were to increase. Since the wage function w(z;z1)
is increasing in z1; the wage paid by the marginal manager would increase. This
marginal manager becomes better o⁄ unleveraged, and z2 therefore increases. The
intersection of the curves zm
2 and zr
2, if it exists, thus uniquely results in an equilibrium
z1 and z2: Moreover, inspection of the system above shows that (11) does not depend
on ￿, while the rent function R(z2;z;w) is increasing in ￿ (by the envelope theorem).
Thus an increase in ￿ shifts zr
2(z1) to the right and results in an increase in z1 and a
decrease in z2:
Proposition (2). 1. The changes in z1 and z2 are shown in Lemma 1 above.
The change in the span n(zw(zm)) follows straighforwardly from the change in the








That is, workers of a given skill are assigned less-skilled managers. Inverting the




Managers of a given skill are assigned more-skilled workers. It follows straighforwardly
that dn=d￿ = n0 dzw(zm)
d￿ > 0: Managers of a given skill are assigned better workers and
manage more of them. To see that the average span for the economy increases, note
simply that the lowest span is unchanged by the entry of new managers, since workers
with skill z are always matched in equilibrium, and the span of teams involving these
workers, n(z), is limited by their skill.
2. To characterize
d[R(z)￿R(z2)]
d￿ we proceed in two steps. First consider the change
in the slope of the rent function dR=dz.
d2R
d￿dzm
= (n(zw) + 1)
￿ log[(n(zw) + 1]









d￿ > 0: Intuitively, since managers leverage their
talent over a team of workers, decreases in coordination costs increase the return
31The calculation containing this derivative is a bit involved and suppressed here; the Mathematica
￿le containing it is available from the authors.
37to managerial talent. The second e⁄ect is the general equilibrium e⁄ect due to the
change in matching; by the argument in the proof of the ￿rst part of the proposition,











d￿ > 0. The ￿rst term is the
direct e⁄ect of ￿, and is positive by the envelope theorem. The second is a general
equilibrium/matching e⁄ect. Managers are matching with better workers, which leads
this term to be positive since dz1=d￿ > 0 by Lemma 1. The last term is also a general
equilibrium e⁄ect;
dz2
d￿ < 0, as Lemma 1 implies that decreases in coordination costs
lead the the earnings of the marginal manager to be lower (as more agents become
managers).￿
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Overhead, Employment, and Revenues
Offices That Are Legally Organized As Partnerships or Proprietorships for 1977 and 1982, As PSOs for 1987 and 1992.
Dependent Variable: (Expenses - 1.15*Payroll) for 1977, 1982; (Revenues - 1.15*Payroll) for 1987, 1992.
1977 1982 1987 1992
C 4.237 0.960 22.672 28.508
(0.928) (1.211) (3.795) (2.508)
Employment 0.407 0.014 0.475 2.864
(0.368) (0.605) (0.802) (0.603)
Market Size*Employment Interactions
20K-100K*Employment -0.958 -0.740 -0.098 0.796
(0.442) (0.679) (0.876) (0.662)
100K-200K*Employment -0.532 1.429 0.483 0.984
(0.516) (0.773) (0.923) (0.701)
200K-400K*Employment -0.236 -0.333 0.551 2.139
(0.456) (0.736) (0.866) (0.647)
400K-1M*Employment 0.903 -0.352 2.433 2.279
(0.451) (0.766) (0.858) (0.657)
More than 1M*Employment 2.616 1.473 4.856 13.896
(0.539) (0.936) (1.008) (0.735)
Revenues Quadratic
Revenues 0.219 0.262 0.279 0.213
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Revenues^2 -9.16E-06 -4.81E-06 -5.88E-06 -7.61E-06
(1.77E-06) (2.75E-06) (3.39E-06) (1.80E-06)
Market Size Dummies
20K-100K 2.195 5.734 -2.707 -1.586
(1.116) (1.439) (4.365) (3.023)
100K-200K 3.927 5.640 -0.043 4.089
(1.364) (1.739) (4.605) (3.319)
200K-400K 6.557 5.276 -2.364 11.098
(1.158) (1.589) (4.255) (2.809)
400K-1M 5.709 11.055 -9.841 7.873
(1.114) (1.554) (4.034) (2.756)
More than 1M 9.865 11.131 -15.302 -20.181
(1.308) (1.980) (4.273) (3.032)
N 12043 4883 10647 10438
R-Squared 0.59 0.59 0.53 0.70
Specification also includes the (uninteracted) field shares of lawyers in the office, and interactions between the field shares
and the revenues quadratic.  Omitted field category is "share(general practitioner)."
Market size dummies are defined in terms of total 1992 employment in the county in which the office is located.
Employment is the total number of individuals (lawyers and non-lawyers) working in the office, minus 2.
Bold indicates rejection of the hypothesis b=0 using a one-tailed t-test of size 0.05.
42Table 5
Wage-Leverage Surface Estimates, 1977-1992
Partnerships and Proprietorships With At Least One Associate
1977 1982 1987 1992
Coefficient Estimates
Associates/Partner -- "Business, Non-Litigation Offices" 0.203 0.177 0.200 0.146
(0.042) (0.053) (0.058) (0.049)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Business, Non-Litigation Offices" 0.008 -0.035 -0.029 -0.021
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Associates/Partner -- "Litigation Offices" 0.085 -0.116 0.067 0.029
(0.057) (0.062) (0.054) (0.043)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Litigation Offices" -0.008 0.048 -0.007 0.007
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010)
Associates/Partner -- "Individual, Non-Litigation Offices" -0.059 -0.104 -0.215 0.002
(0.058) (0.065) (0.080) (0.060)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Individual, Non-Litigation Offices" 0.020 0.044 0.053 -0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.016)
Share(Banking Law Specialist) 0.381 -0.020 0.234 0.193
(0.067) (0.078) (0.072) (0.062)
Share(Corporate Law Specialist) 0.387 0.318 0.579 0.675
(0.051) (0.061) (0.061) (0.058)
Share(Insurance Law Specialist) 0.192 -0.036 0.226 0.232
(0.062) (0.070) (0.066) (0.046)
Share(Negligence-Defense Specialist) 0.182 0.030 0.245 0.263
(0.056) (0.067) (0.061) (0.048)
Share(Patent Law Specialist) 0.206 0.219 0.404 0.413
(0.047) (0.051) (0.066) (0.055)
Share(Government Law Specialist) 0.037 0.250 0.548
(0.099) (0.129) (0.070)
Share(Environmental Law Specialist) 0.517
(0.104)
Share(Real Estate Law Specialist) 0.088 0.159 0.148 0.375
(0.053) (0.065) (0.051) (0.049)
Share(Tax Law Specialist) 0.379 0.489 0.368 0.603
(0.076) (0.104) (0.109) (0.107)
Share(Criminal Law Specialist) -0.017 -0.169 -0.062 -0.265
(0.080) (0.106) (0.093) (0.057)
Share(Domestic Law Specialist) -0.258 -0.020 -0.217 0.082
(0.083) (0.105) (0.078) (0.072)
Share(Negligence-Plaintiff Specialist) 0.087 0.094 -0.055 0.163
(0.060) (0.074) (0.064) (0.048)
Share(Probate Law Specialist) 0.157 -0.019 0.389 0.319
(0.064) (0.085) (0.100) (0.085)
Share(Other Specialist) 0.275 0.160 0.181 0.252
(0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.029)
R-Squared 0.39 0.50 0.48 0.61
N 7560 3058 4835 5319
Estimated percent change in earnings from moving from ap=0.5 to ap=1.5: exp[w(1.5)]/exp[w(0.5)]
Business, Non-Litigation Offices 4% 11% 15% 11%
Litigation Offices 7% -2% 5% 4%
Individual, Non-Litigation Offices -1% -1% -10% -5%
The dependent variable in the wage-leverage surface regression is ln(average associate pay in the office).  Offices with at least one lawyer specializing in insurance
or negligence law are classified as "litigation" offices.  All other offices are classified as "business" or "individual" depending on whether the majority of their



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Production Function Estimates, 1977-1992
Partnerships and Proprietorships With At Least One Associate
1977 1982 1987 1992
Coefficient Estimates
Constant 0.603 0.478 0.463 0.336
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Number of Partners -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0034 0.0013
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
Number of Partners**2 -5.90E-05 4.82E-05 4.04E-05 -9.30E-07
(8.40E-06) (7.34E-06) (5.23E-06) (2.82E-06)
Share(Banking Law Specialist) -0.226 0.054 -0.281 -0.005
(0.039) (0.055) (0.046) (0.037)
Share(Corporate Law Specialist) -0.034 -0.024 -0.120 -0.201
(0.025) (0.037) (0.033) (0.029)
Share(Insurance Law Specialist) -0.071 -0.013 -0.058 -0.077
(0.028) (0.034) (0.032) (0.021)
Share(Negligence-Defense Specialist) -0.029 0.170 0.080 0.066
(0.022) (0.029) (0.028) (0.021)
Share(Patent Law Specialist) 0.023 0.030 -0.071 -0.075
(0.023) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029)
Share(Government Law Specialist) -0.101 0.038
(0.065) (0.044)
Share(Environmental Law Specialist) 0.144
(0.068)
Share(Real Estate Law Specialist) -0.038 -0.108 -0.001 -0.141
(0.034) (0.046) (0.036) (0.035)
Share(Tax Law Specialist) 0.123 0.062 -0.032 0.060
(0.042) (0.077) (0.072) (0.063)
Share(Criminal Law Specialist) -0.058 0.073 0.176 0.075
(0.054) (0.094) (0.073) (0.046)
Share(Domestic Law Specialist) -0.105 -0.022 -0.109 0.139
(0.056) (0.083) (0.063) (0.053)
Share(Negligence-Plaintiff Specialist) 0.045 0.237 0.253 0.366
(0.031) (0.047) (0.036) (0.026)
Share(Probate Law Specialist) -0.028 0.007 -0.134 -0.119
(0.040) (0.066) (0.068) (0.057)
Share(Other Specialist) -0.014 0.069 0.025 0.007
(0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.017)
R-Squared 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07
N 7560 3058 4835 5319
Average Predicted Value for Theta 0.57 0.63 0.66 0.71
The dependent variable in the production function is ln(revenues/lawyer*(1-K))-ln(MC), where K is the coefficient on revenues in the overhead regression
for the office, and MC is the estimated marginal cost of leverage for the office.  The coefficients reported here correspond to -ln(theta) in the text.
The 0.343 coefficient estimate in 1992 for the constant implies an estimate of theta of 0.710 for an office of general practitioners (the omitted category).































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Changes in Logged Earnings Quantile Ratios, Privately-Practicing Lawyers, 1977-1992
ln(90th/50th) ln(95th/50th) ln(95th/90th)
All Offices
Estimated Earnings 0.20 0.33 0.13
Estimated Earnings, Absent Hierarchical Production 0.16 0.21 0.04
Residual Change in Earnings Inequality 0.03 0.13 0.09
Residual Change as Percent of Estimated Earnings Change 17% 38% 69%
By Office Class
Estimated Earnings
Business, Non-Litigation 0.11 0.23 0.12
Litigation 0.31 0.46 0.15
Individual, Non-Litigation 0.48 0.54 0.06
Estimated Earnings, Absent Hierarchical Production
Business, Non-Litigation 0.11 0.14 0.02
Litigation 0.25 0.31 0.07
Individual, Non-Litigation 0.41 0.54 0.13
Residual Change in Earnings Inequality
Business, Non-Litigation 0.00 0.09 0.09
Litigation 0.07 0.15 0.08
Individual, Non-Litigation 0.07 0.00 -0.07
Residual Change as Percent of Estimated Earnings Change
Business, Non-Litigation 0% 41% 80%
Litigation 21% 32% 55%
Individual, Non-Litigation 14% 0% -117%
Residual Change in Earnings Inequality is the difference between the figures in the "estimated earnings" panel and the "estimated earnings,
absent hierarchical production" panel.  This is a measure of the degree to which changes in leverage have affected earnings inequality.
Change In Logged Quantile Ratios, 1977-1992
49Table 12
Decomposition of Productivity Changes
Revenues Per Lawyer and Its Components
Year yi=(ni + 1) zm s cov(zmi;si)
1977 182 222 0.86 -9
1982 167 205 0.86 -9
1987 225 285 0.83 -13
1992 227 280 0.86 -12
Decomposition of Changes in Revenues Per Lawyer
￿yi=(ni + 1) ￿zm st ￿s zm;t￿1 ￿cov(zmi;si)
1977-1992 46 49 0 -3











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Workers Unleveraged Leveraged Managers
Figure 2. Equilibrium Earnings and Assignment. The three curves in this
Figure represent agents￿earnings as a function of their skill, z, if they are (a) managers with
others working under them (R(z;n)), (b) working on their own (R(z;0)) and (c) workers
working under managers (w(z)). The equilibrium wage-skill surface is the outer envelope
of these curves, which is in bold. A goal of the empirical work is to estimate how R(z;0)
changes over time.
53